Barberis, Cesidio V. "Butch"[Maj. 1Bn9thIR]Korean war unit commands:
|1/23||23rd Infantry Regiment||xo||12Aug50|
|1/9||1st Battalion 9th Infnatry Regiment|
|2/9||2nd Battalion 9th Infantry Regiment|
AWARDS AND CITATIONS
(UNCONFIRMED - Citation Needed): Major (Infantry) Cesides V. Barberis (ASN: 0-33249), United States Army, was awarded the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in connection with military operations against the enemy in Korea, while serving with Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, on 1 September 1950.General Orders: Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, General Orders No. 42 (1950)
(UNCONFIRMED - Citation Needed): Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) Cesides V. Barberis (ASN: 0-33249), United States Army, was awarded a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a Second Award of the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in connection with military operations against the enemy in Korea, while serving with Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, on 30 November 1950.General Orders: Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, General Orders No. 82 (1951)
August 12, 1950
When Freeman received Dutch Keiser's orders to provide a combat team to help rescue the 24th Division, he chose the 1/23. It was commanded by another new arrival to the division, West Pointer (1938) Claire E. Hutchin, thirty-four. Hutchin had never led troops in combat. During World War II he had been a Pentagon war plans officer; in the postwar period he had accompanied the Marshall mission to China. But Hutchin was fortunate to draw an able, combat experienced exec, Cesidio V. ("Butch") Barberis, who had served in Walker's XX Corps in World War II.
19500812 0000 208tfw0
August 13, 1950
Led by Barberis, the 1/23 attacked toward Yŏngsan-ni,, in conjunction with the 2/27 and 3/27, on August 13. Like most American units newly committed to combat in Korea, the 1/23 had a rough first day. One Army historian wrote: "Unprepared for the heat and humidity of a Korean August and poorly conditioned for hill climbing, the men struggled slowly from one ridge to the next. Meanwhile, the combat hardened 2/27 and 3/27 cracked through the NKPA and cleared the MSR and went into Yŏngsan-ni,.
Later that day Hutchin himself led a patrol of his 1/23 into the town. Still later the rest of his battalion marched wearily in behind him. Credited with another smashing triumph ("saving the 24th Division), the Wolfhounds withdrew that night for other missions. Hutchin's 1/23 remained to reinforce the division and to guard the MSR against further NKPA incursions.
With his rear at last under control, Church refocused his attention on his "front. The situation there was still grave. In renewed, vicious attacks, wave after wave of stoic NKPA troops had inflicted further grievous casualties on the 9th and the ragged remnants of the 19th and 34th regiments.
The 9th, bravely attempting to preserve its honor, was hit particularly hard. In E Company of Walker's 2/9 all the officers had been wiped out on five separate occasions. Throughout the regiment sergeants routinely commanded platoons in place of lieutenants. In all, on August 13 the 9th suffered 140 battle casualties and 59 non-battle casualties, mostly from heat exhaustion. Ned Moore's 19th Infantry journal noted that the men of Londahl's 1 /9 were "too exhausted even to remove their own dead."
Charles Payne of the 1/34 remembered the fighting:
Masses of gooks poured over the hills and through the gaps like a flood. Our people were fighting like seasoned troops but were just being overpowered.... Hour after hour we held the North Koreans off. . . . Time and time again the gooks rushed us. Each time we'd lose a man, the gooks would lose many. The ground was covered with their dead. We stacked our dead around us for protection. The battle seemed to go on forever.[7-73]
19500813 0000 208tfw0
Task Force Hill
Determined finally to eject the NKPA from the 24th Division front, Church that night (August 13) ordered Hill, John G. [Col CO 9thIR] to take command of all the available infantry and launch yet another counterattack on the following day. Reeling with fatigue and lack of sleep, Hill summoned the no less exhausted Beauchamp, Charles Edward [Col. CO 34thIR], Moore, Ned Dalton [Col. CO 19thIR], and Smith, Charles Brad [Lt. Col. CO 1bn21stIR] to his CP.
They drew plans which would employ all seven depleted infantry battalions (about 4,000 men), backed by all available artillery (five batteries, mounting thirty howitzers) and (they hoped) supported by FEAF close air. Hill also attempted to draw Hutchin, Claire E.[Officer CO 1Bn23rdIR] 's newly arrived and powerful 1/23 (900 men) into this combined force.
Barberis, Cesidio V. "Butch"[Maj. 1Bn9thIR] remembered:
"I stopped off at John Hill's Ninth Regiment CP and told him the MSR was clear and we would be happy to help evacuate his wounded, et cetera, et cetera. Hill was in quite a dither. In fact, in my estimation he was not in control of his faculties. He was quite irrational. He ordered me to position the battalion in the line. I explained we were not under his command but under Church's direct command. He was quite forceful in telling me that he was giving me a direct order and that I would comply with that direct order. I telephoned Church, and in short order he countermanded Hill and told me to maintain my vigil on the MSR and await further orders."
19500813 0000 209tfw0