By daylight on July 25 the NKPA had overwhelmed or scattered three of the four infantry battalions of the 5th and 8th Cav. Of the four, only Robert Kanes 1/8 on the Taegu - Taejon road had held together. By that time the 7th Cav, commanded by West Pointer (1923) Cecil W. Nist, forty-nine, had landed at Pohang. Ordered to leave the 1/7 at Pohang to relieve Teeters's 1/35, Nist came up with his headquarters elements and the 2/7 to help the 5th and 8th Cav's. Flung willy-nilly into battle, the 2/7, commanded by Herbert B. Heyer, thirty-nine, buckled and began what the 7th Cav historian charitably characterized as "a chaotic withdrawal.
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The visitors closely scrutinized Eighth Army's senior field commanders. Ridgway had nothing to say about the division commanders, but he judged that "some" regimental commanders were "very poor." They were too old and lacked "combat experience and aggressiveness." He named no names, but undoubtedly he was referring to the three regimental commanders in the 1st Cav (Rohsenberger, Nist, and Palmer) and the 24th Infantry's Horton White. Although both Dick Stephens (21st Infantry) and Hank Fisher (35th Infantry) were considerably overage for regimental command, they were doing well, as were the "youngsters," Michaelis (27th Infantry), Beauchamp (34th Infantry), and Moore (19th Infantry). Replacements being sent by the Pentagon didn't help. "Three out of five were over fifty," Ridgway wrote.*