Joint Operations Center

Def after Aug 9



(call sign Angelo)

Although he could not yet move the advanced echelon of Fifth Air Force headquarters to Korea, General Partridge was anxious to open a Joint Operations Center at Taejŏn.#9

June 25, 1950

 Recognizing the limited value of battalion-level training, General Partridge worked earnestly to secure closer joint operations with the Eighth Army. Following the failure of communications in a joint theater-command post exercise early in April 1950, Partridge specifically recommended that a joint operations center be established, with regularly assigned Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives. Unfortunately, this proposal was not approved by the Far East Command.#83

He will cry about this for the next year.

 The air units in FEAF lacked much that they needed for peak effectiveness, but all of them were able to operate on the day that the war began.

Such was not true of the engineer aviation units assigned to FEAF, and this construction capability was a significant weakness to offensive planning.

 Assigned to FEAF were two engineer aviation group headquarters and service companies, five engineer aviation battalions, and one engineer aviation maintenance company. Headquarters and Service Company, 930th Engineer Aviation Group, was assigned to the Fifth Air Force. With station at Nagoya, this group directed construction done by civilian contractors in Japan.

Assigned to the Twentieth Air Force was the Headquarters and Service Company, 931st Engineer Aviation Group, the 802nd, 808th, 811th, 822nd, and 839th Engineer Aviation Battalions, and the 919th Engineer Aviation Maintenance Company. All of these units except the 811th Battalion (which was stationed on Guam) were engaged in construction work on Okinawa.#84


62   U.S. Air Force in Korea

 All aviation engineer troops were "Special Category Army Personnel with Air Force"  (SCARWAF) troops. They were recruited, trained, and assigned to units by the Department of Army, but they were charged against Air Force strength. All of these aviation engineer units were in sad shape.

Theater-work assignments had not developed battalion skills. Serving on Guam-where a normal tour of duty was twelve months-the 811th Battalion was "totally untrained.#

In the scheduled construction projects on Okinawa, the prime duty of the 822nd Battalion had been to operate a rock quarry. Most engineer equipment was war-weary from World War II, and, for some more obsolete items, spare parts were no longer stocked.

Engineer aviation skill specialties had been marked by inadequate training and improper balances of supervisory and operating personnel.


July 3, 1950

At Itazuke, on 3 July, General Timberlake accordingly organized a combat operations section, drawing officers from the advanced echelon and airmen from the 8th Communications Squadron, in all, 10 officers and 35 airmen. Lt. Col. John R. Murphy was named officer-in-charge of the operations section, and he moved his personnel and equipment to Taejŏn on 5 and 6 July, and set up for business at the 24th Division's headquarters in an office adjoining the division G-3. Later on FEAF would say that the JOC opened at Taejŏn on 5 July, #10

July 5, 1950

July 5: A Joint Operations Center opened at Taejŏn to provide better close air support for US ground forces, which, near Osan, battled, for the first time, North Korean troops.

Several Fifth Air Force staff offices had begun to function in Taegu well before 24 July.

July 12, 1950

Sometime after 12 July, when he realized that Taejŏn would be lost, Lt. Col. John R. Murphy began to move the heavier equipment and a part of the personnel of the Air Force combat operations section back to Taegu.

July 13, 1950

As the front squeezed in upon Taejŏn, the T6s evacuated to Taegu on July 13 and fell under the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron's command the following day.

July 14, 1950


When he established EUSAK in Taegu, General Walker named officers to serve as G-2 and G-3 Air representatives in an air-ground operations section of a joint operations center, and thus, effective on 14 July, the Fifth Air Force-Eighth Army joint operations center began to function.#121

The Joint Operations Center followed in stages between July 14 and 19.

July 15, 1950

Several Fifth Air Force staff offices had begun to function in Taegu well before 24 July. [perhaps as early as the 20th, after the JOC finished their move???]

September 1, 1950


When Task Force 77's fliers began to report in, the Joint Operations Center sent the Navy pilots to support the 2nd Division. Although Task Force 77 launched 85 sorties during the afternoon, the Navy support did not work out very well for several reasons. Having reversed course, the Navy carriers launched maximum striking forces while they were still some 250 miles from the target area. All flights were supposed to report to "Mellow" control and obtain target designations and directions. But when the swarms of Navy planes, already short on fuel from their 250-mile trip, began to report to "Mellow," the result was fairly obvious: communications channels were overloaded and could not handle all of the Navy's flights within the time permitted by their reduced fuel loads. Some of the Navy planes could not wait and had to jettison their bombs and return to their carriers without making a contribution to the battle.#125