Unit Details

NKPA 10th Division

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III Corps

 

10th KPA Division The Division was organized in April 1950 with the 25th, 27th, and 29th Infantry Regiments using experienced KPA cadres and new recruits.

 

Regiments 25, 27, 29

10th Division (North Korea)

The 10th Infantry Division (Motorized), was a military formation of the Korean People's Army during the 20th Century. It may have been formed at Sukch'on as early as March or April 1950 and consisted of a cadre of experienced People’s Army officers and NCO’s and new recruits.

From the date of its formation to June 25, it trained at Sukch'on, then moved to Chaeryŏng for a month’s training under Soviet advisors in night fighting and mountain warfare. The unit was originally composed of the 25th (Motorized), 27th (Motorized) and the 29th Regiment (Motorized) in addition to an artillery regiment, though the Korea Institute of Military History indicates that the unit may have been established with the 107th Regiment rather than the 29th Infantry and that it also included an unidentified armor regiment.

Was part of the North Korean advance from Sŏul to Taejŏn.

Fought in the Battle of Pusan Perimeter.

 

 

 

 

June 25, 1950

Korean_War

This shows only seven (7) NKPA divisions, with the other three, the 105th was actually a brigade, 13th and 15th were reserve.

I NKPA Corps (Western zone)

II NKPA Corps (Eastern zone)

III NKPA Corps (Reserve)

[note]

July 8, 1950

On the 8th, General Kean and an advance party flew from Osaka, Japan, to Taejŏn for a conference with General Dean.

July 10, 1950

Korean_War

Two days later the 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhound) landed at Pusan. There the regiment learned that its new commander was Lt. Col. John H. "Mike" Michaelis.

July 12, 1950

Korean_War

On the 12th, a second regiment, the 24th Infantry, an all-Negro regiment and the only regiment in the Eighth Army having three battalions, arrived in Korea. Col. Horton V. White commanded it.

The 27th Infantry at first went to the Uisŏng area, thirty-five miles north of Taegu. General Kean opened his first 25th Division command post in Korea at Yongch'on, midway between Taegu and P'ohang-dong.

On 12, July General Dean ordered him to dispose the 25th Division, less one battalion which was to secure Yŏnil Airfield, so as to block enemy movement south from Ch'ungju. One regiment was to be in reserve at Kŭmch'ŏn ready to move either to the Taejon or the Ch'ŏngju area. [08-14]

July 13, 1950

The next day, 13 July, the 27th Infantry moved from Uisŏng to Andong on Eighth Army orders to take up blocking positions north of the town behind ROK troops.

Korean_War

On or about 13 July, the N.K. 5th Division entered P'yonghae-ri, twenty-two miles above Yŏngdök and fifty miles from P'ohang-dong. There the 10th Regiment turned westward into the mountains and headed for Chinbo, back of Yŏngdök.

The enemy advances down the mountain backbone of central Korea and on the east coast had assumed alarming proportions. The attack on Yŏngdök, the first critical and major action on the east coast, was at hand.

Korean_War

General Dean tried to give this front additional strength by assembling there the advanced units of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Kean. It was the second United States division to be committed in the war and arrived in Korea between 10 and 15 July.

July 15, 1950

Korean_War

Lastly, the 35th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Henry G. Fisher, arrived at Pusan between 13 and 15 July. [08-13]

July 25, 1950

The Enemy 10th Division's Crossing at Yongp'o

 It had started from Sukch'on for the front by rail about 25 July.

The North Korean plan for the attack against Taegu from the west and southwest had called for the N.K. 10th Division to make a coordinated attack with the N.K. 3rd Division. The 10th Division so far had not been in combat. It had started from Sukch'on for the front by rail about 25 July.

The Taegu Front

August

General Walker's primary objective in August was to retain a foothold in Korea. From this he intended to launch an attack later when his forces were of sufficient strength. Walker kept saying to his key staff officers and to his principal commanders substantially the following:

"You keep your mind on the fact that we will win this thing by attacking. Never let an opportunity to attack pass. I want the capability and opportunity to pass to the offensive. Until that time comes I want all commanders to attack-to raid-to capture prisoners and thus keep the enemy off balance. If that is done, more and more opportunities to hurt the enemy will arise and our troops will be better prepared to pass to a general offensive when things are ripe. [19-1]

General Walker wanted the foothold in Korea to include the rail route from Pusan north through Miryang to Taegu, eastward to KYŏngju, and back to Pusan. (See Map IV.) This would make possible the logistical support necessary for a breakout offensive later. To retain this circumferential communication net, General Walker had to combine a fine sense of timing with a judicious use of the small reserves he was able to assemble at any given time. [19-2] He had to know just when to move his limited reserves and where. They had to be at the right place and not too late. A study of the defensive fighting of the Pusan Perimeter by Eighth Army and the ROK Army will reveal that Walker proved himself a master in it.

[remember COMINT See August 2, 1950]

communications intelligence (COMINT)

The difficulty of forming a small reserve was one of the principal problems that confronted the Eighth Army staff during August and September 1950. It was a daily concern to the Eighth Army commander. Colonel Landrum, Eighth Army's chief of staff during August, considered it one of his most important daily tasks to find any unit that could be "tagged" as an army reserve. This search included both Eighth Army and ROK troops. It was considered a certainty that any troops so designated would be committed somewhere on the Perimeter within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. One of General Walker's daily greetings to his chief of staff was, "Landrum, how many reserves have you dug up for me today?" [19-3]

General Walker left most of the headquarters work to his staff. He spent the greater part of each day on visits to his combat units. It fell to Colonel Landrum to keep him fully informed of what had happened around the Perimeter front during his absence from headquarters. Landrum did this every day when Walker returned to Taegu. In addition to keeping in close touch with the army G-2, G-3, and G-3, Air, Colonel Landrum made it a practice to telephone each major combat unit sometime between 2200 and midnight each night and talk with the unit commander or the chief off staff about the situation on that part of the front. This provided fresh information and reflected the state of mind of the various commanders at that moment. On the basis of these nightly telephone calls, General Walker often planned his trips the next day. He went where he felt a serious situation was or might be developing. [19-4]

The central, or Taegu, front was to present its full measure of problems involving the use of limited reserves hastily assembled from another part of the perimeter. It was a sector where the Eighth Army commander needed to make a reasonably correct appraisal of the situation day by day. For here several corridors of approach southward converged on the valley of the Naktong, and the enemy forces advancing down these corridors were assembling in relatively great strength in close supporting distance of each other. The enemy frontal pressure against Taegu developed concurrently with that on both flanks already described.

The North Koreans Cross the Naktong for the Attack on Taegu

The enemy forces assembled in an arc around Taegu, from south to north, were the N.K. 10th, 3rd, 15th, 13th, and 1st Divisions, and elements of the 105th Armored Division. They reached from Tŭksŏng-dong on the south, northward around Waegwan to Kunwi. [19-5] This concentration north and west of Taegu indicated that the North Koreans expected to use the natural corridor of the Naktong valley from Sangju to Taegu as a principal axis of attack in the next phase of their drive south. [19-6] (Map 13)

August

(Map 13: THE N.K. ATTACKS ON TAEGU, 4-24 August 1950.)

THE TAEGU FRONT Page 337

August

Across the Naktong opposite the five North Korean divisions, in early August, were, from south to north, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions of the ROK II Corps. The boundary between the 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division lay about two miles north of Waegwan and ten air miles northwest of Taegu. The 70th Division and part of the 3rd Division were opposite the 1st Cavalry Division. Opposite the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions were part of the 3rd, and the 15th, 13th, and 1st Divisions, together with supporting units of the 105th Armored Division.

Like the 24th Infantry Division just south of it, the 1st Cavalry Division had a long front. From south to north, the 7th, 8th, and 5th Cavalry Regiments were on line in that order. The two battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment west of Taegu each had a front of about 10,000 yards.

 

August 8, 1950

At Ch'ŏnan it left the trains and continued southward on foot, passing through Taejon and arriving at the Naktong opposite Waegwan on or about 8 August.

August 10, 1950

There it received its combat orders two days later 10 August. Its mission was to cross the Naktong River in the vicinity of Tŭksŏng-dong, penetrate east, and cut the Taegu-Pusan main supply road.

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August.

There it received its combat orders two days later. Its mission was to cross the Naktong River in the vicinity of Tŭksŏng-dong, penetrate east, and cut the Taegu-Pusan main supply road.

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August.

August 11, 1950

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August. There it was astride the main highway running northeast to Taegu over a partially destroyed Naktong bridge. [19-26]

Eighth Army purposely had not completely destroyed this bridge; it was passable for foot soldiers but not for vehicles. In its partially destroyed condition it provided something of a trap if used by an enemy crossing force, because the bridge and its approaches channeled any enemy movement over it and were completely covered by pre-registered mortar and artillery fire. To this was to be added the fire of infantry weapons located in good defensive positions on the hills near the river.

Two regiments of the N.K. 10th Division, the 29th on the south and the 25th on the north, were to make the assault crossing with the 27th Regiment in reserve. The commander of the 25th Regiment issued an order on the eve of the crossing, stating that the objective was to "destroy the enemy in Taegu City in coordination with the 3d Infantry Division." [19-27]

The division [N.K. 10th Division] assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August. There it was astride the main highway running northeast to Taegu over a partially destroyed Naktong bridge. [19-26]

Eighth Army purposely had not completely destroyed this bridge; it was passable for foot soldiers but not for vehicles. In its partially destroyed condition it provided something of a trap if used by an enemy crossing force, because the bridge and its approaches channeled any enemy movement over it and were completely covered by pre-registered mortar and artillery fire. To this was to be added the fire of infantry weapons located in good defensive positions on the hills near the river.

Two regiments of the N.K. 10th Division, the 29th  on the south and the 25th on the north, were to make the assault crossing with the 27th  Regiment in reserve. The commander of the 25th Regiment issued an order on the eve of the crossing, stating that the objective was to "destroy the enemy in Taegu City in coordination with the 3rd Infantry Division." [19-27]

The division assembled in the Koryong area the next day, 11 August. There it was astride the main highway running northeast to Taegu over a partially destroyed Naktong bridge. [19-26]

Eighth Army purposely had not completely destroyed this bridge; it was passable for foot soldiers but not for vehicles. In its partially destroyed condition it provided something of a trap if used by an enemy crossing force, because the bridge and its approaches channeled any enemy movement over it and were completely covered by pre-registered mortar and artillery fire. To this was to be added the fire of infantry weapons located in good defensive positions on the hills near the river.

Two regiments of the N.K. 10th Division, the 29th on the south and the 25th on the north, were to make the assault crossing with the 27th Regiment in reserve. The commander of the 25th Regiment issued an order on the eve of the crossing, stating that the objective was to "destroy the enemy in Taegu City in coordination with the 3d Infantry Division." [19-27]

At Ch'onan it [N.K. 10th Division] left the trains and continued southward on foot, passing through Taejŏn and arriving at the Naktong opposite Waegwan on or about 8 August. [ It had started from Sukch'on for the front by rail about 25 July. ]

During the action in the southwest sector of the Pusan Perimeter in the first two weeks of August the NKPA continued pressure on the Taegu front. However, the NKPA having split off four of its crack divisions (2nd; 4th; 6th; 9th [sb 3rd) to fight in the southwest sector, its strength at Taegu was greatly diminished.

The_NK_Attack_on_Taegu_4-24_August_1950.pdf

Initially, only four NKPA divisions (1st; 3rd; 13th; 15th) remained to mount the attack on the main axis from the northwest. Three of these divisions (1st; 3rd; 15th) had been severely mauled in earlier fighting and probably were at no more than half strength (about 5,000 men). The 13th, activated in June 1950, was not well trained or battle-experienced. A fifth division (10th) was added to the Taegu front in early August. However, it, too, was green and had no combat experience, and furthermore, the Army historian wrote, it was saddled with "inept" commanders.[8-1]

Beyond that, the NKPA plan to take Taegu was not well conceived. Rather than concentrate the five divisions (about 35,000 men) for a massed attack along a single line of advance from the northwest, the NKPA spread them fanwise, across a forty mile arc of the perimeter, to conduct, in effect, five separate attacks down several roads. None of the individual attacks had sufficient force behind it to exploit a breakthrough.

* * *

Walker had three divisions (about 35,000 men) defending the northwest sector: the 1st Cav and the ROK 1st and 6th divisions. The 1st Cav, dug in behind the Naktong River directly west of Taegu, held a sector which stretched along the meandering Naktong, south to north, from Yongp'o to Waegwan. The ROK 1st Division held a sector from Waegwan north along the Naktong to the town of Naktong. The ROK 6th Division continued the line eastward.[8-2]

August 12, 1950

Bio

Over the next two days Clainos and his Clouters mounted a powerful and devastating counterattack in the 1/5 sector. Of the 1,000 NKPA troops that got across the Naktong, 700 were killed, wounded, or captured. The remaining 300 fled back across the river to find that the once-mighty 3rd Division victors at the Kum River and Taejŏn had been reduced to a disorganized unit of barely 2,500 men. Its abortive attack on the 5th Cav, the Army historian wrote, had been a "catastrophe," and it could pose no further serious threat to Taegu.[8-13]

The next NKPA attack came at Yongp'o, where the 2/7 faced the road from Koryong. The assault was mounted by the ineptly led, green NKPA 10th Division, which had only just arrived at Koryong. Its attack was probably planned to coincide with that of the NKPA 3rd Division, but something went wrong. The 10th Division did not jump off until August 12, three days behind the 3rd, a lapse that gave Hap Gay time to redeploy Clainos's Clouters.

Bio

The 10th Division did not jump off until August 12, three days behind the 3rd, a lapse that gave Hap Gay time to redeploy Clainos's Clouters.

The 2/7 now had a new, aggressive, and battle-experienced commander. He was Gilman A. Huff, a former enlisted man who had won a battlefield commission and numerous medals for valor in the ETO. He was "a strange individual," Gay wrote, a "trial" and a "drunk" when resting but a wonderful" fighter in war.

The 2/7 was backed by the steady 77th FAB. Its commander, William A. ("Billy") Harris, was a West Point (1933) classmate of Pete Clainos and an aggressive and colorful officer. He was one of two sons of a retired Army major general and the nephew of West Pointer General Peter C. Harris, who had been the powerful adjutant general of the Army in World War I and afterward. Billy's older brother, Hunter, one year ahead of him at West Point, was a well-known Air Force bomber expert who had, in 1950, been selected as a brigadier general, and was to go on to four stars.

These high Army connections had probably saved Billy Harris from being washed out of West Point. In 1933, when he was a first classman (senior), standing high in his class, he developed such severe stomach trouble" that the medical department recommended he not graduate. Learning of this, Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur summoned Harris to Washington for a personal interview. Standing at attention, knees knocking, Harris made a good case for being allowed to graduate. "Do you think you're well enough to be an officer?" MacArthur asked.

"Yes, sir," Harris replied.

"I do too," MacArthur said, concluding the interview and dismissing Cadet Harris. "Go back to West Point."

In World War II, while older brother Hunter was gaining fame and glory in the Eighth Air Force, Billy was stuck in an ETO staff job, albeit one of the most fascinating and hush-hush in the theater. He was a senior American representative on the British conceived deception plan for the Overlord invasion. Known as Fortitude, the plan was designed to convince Hitler and his generals that Overlord was a feint, that the real invasion would come at the Pas de Calais and in Norway. The job cleared Harris for Ultra (information from breaking the German military codes) and other high-level secrets, but it denied him a combat command. He finished out the war in the ETO on Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group intelligence staff and then spent three postwar years in the Pentagon, still suffering from a bad stomach.

By 0900, however, the 2nd Battalion, with the powerful help of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion and of air strikes, drove the enemy troops back through Yongp'o toward the bridge and dispersed them. [19-23]

It could not be assumed that this failure would end the efforts of the N.K. 10th Division west of Taegu. In the three days from 10 to 12 August the Naktong River had dropped three feet and was only shoulder-deep at many places. The opportunity for large-scale enemy crossings was at hand. [19-30]