The Eighth US. Army (EUSA) served as the Japan occupation force headquartered in Yokohama. It established a forward headquarters in Taegu (sometimes spelled Taegue), South Korea, on 9 July 1950.
On 13 July it assumed command of all U.S. forces in Korea and formed Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), to control all forces within the country.
EUSA assumed direct command of all R.O.K. forces on 17 July 1950 from UNC. EUSA thus became the operational command of all U.S., UN., and R.O.K. ground forces in Korea while Far East Command controlled supporting U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy forces in the region.
Once the front was stabilized, an Advanced Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was maintained in Sŏul while the Main Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, was in Taegu. Major U.S. formations and units assigned to EUSA and the dates of their assignment follow.
June 26, 1950
On 26 June the Eighth Army had just completed battalion-level training and had begun regiment-level training in its four infantry divisions. At this time two tactical air control parties (TACP's) were preparing for amphibious landing exercises scheduled at Camp McGill, Japan. The two TACP's (large enough for expansion into four TACP's if necessary), however, were special duty units, made up of individuals taken away from other primary duties, for FEAF had no assigned tactical control group for close support work with ground troops. For that matter, the USAF had only one such group, and it was located at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina .
As of 26 June 1950 the Eighth Army was just completing battalion-level training. To expedite the mutual phases of this training, the Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force had exchanged liaison officers, and 16 out of 25 battalion tests conducted between March and May had included close-support (CAS) demonstrations under the direction of tactical air-control parties provided by the 620th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.
The provisional air-control parties had obtained some
beneficial experience, but for the most part these battalion demonstrations were
"canned" problems, conducted over well-known ranges and lacking realism to the
airmen who flew them. In many instances the lack of adequate bombing and gunnery
ranges convenient to Army posts in populous Japan forced the aircrews to
simulate their supporting strikes.