Unit Details

13th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm)

      Unit InfoUnit Info

 

August 26, 1950

At the same time, Eighth Army also reduced to paper status the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, which had been in support of the 34th Infantry, and transferred its troops and equipment to the newly activated C Batteries of the 11th, 13th, and 52nd Field Artillery Battalions. The effective dates for the transfer were 26 August for the artillery and 31 August for the infantry.

 

 

13th Field Artillery Battalion

Headquarters Company

CO  Commanding Officer

Rank Name From To Status
LtCol Charles W. Stratton        
             

XO  Executive Officer

Rank Name From To Status
          
             

S-1 Personnel

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

S-2 Intelligence

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

S-3 Plan sand Operations

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

S-4 Logistics

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

A Battery

A Battery

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

1st Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

2nd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

3rd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

B Battery

B Battery

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

1st Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

2nd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

3rd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

C Battery

C Battery

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

1st Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

2nd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

3rd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

4th Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

D Battery

D Battery

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

1st Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

2nd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

3rd Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

4th Gun

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

.

Medical Detachment

Medical Detachment

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

Service Company

Service Company

Rank Name From To Status
             
             

,

 

Unit Info

Unit Info

 

   

 

 

13th FIELD ARTILLERY


(The Clan)
Heraldic Items
Coat Of Arms
Shield: Per bend gules and tenné a bend or, on a sinister canton argent
a mullet of the like fimbriated of the first within a fishhook
fesswise ring to dexter, barb to base of the first, a broken howitzer
proper.


Crest: On a wreath of the colors, or and gules, a dragon rampant of
the last.


Motto: Without Fear, Favor, or the Hope of Reward.
Symbolism: Scarlet and yellow are the colors used for field artillery. The
regiment was organized in 1917 from personnel of the 5th
Field Artillery, represented in the canton. The bend is taken
from the arms of Lorraine where the heaviest fighting of the
regiment occurred. The broken howitzer alludes to the Vesle
River where heavy losses were sustained and the two pieces
put out of action by direct hits.
T he dragon commemorates a march from Esnes to Malincourt
during the night of 26–27 September 1918 over very difficult
terrain and against resistance. The dragon, a mythical creature,
typifies the inferno prevailing that night.


Distinctive Unit Insignia
On an oval argent within a diminished bordure gules the crest of the
regiment.


Lineage And Honors
Lineage
Constituted 1 July 1916 in the Regular Army as the 13th Field Artillery.
Organized 1 June 1917 at Camp Stewart, Texas. Assigned 10 December 1917 to
the 4th Division. Relieved 4 October 1920 from assignment to the 4th Division.
Assigned 1 March 1921 to the Hawaiian Division (later redesignated as the 24th
Infantry Division).
Reorganized and redesignated 1 October 1941 as the 13th Field Artillery
Battalion.
Relieved 31 March 1958 from assignment to the 24th Infantry Division; concurrently,
reorganized and redesignated as the 13th Artillery, a parent regiment

 

LINEAGES AND HERALDIC DATA 459
under the Combat Arms Regimental System. Redesignated 1 September 1971
as the 13th Field Artillery. Withdrawn 16 March 1987 from the Combat Arms
Regimental System and reorganized under the United States Army Regimental
System.
Campaign Participation Credit


World War I
Aisne‑Marne
St. Mihiel
Meuse‑Argonne
Champagne 1918
Lorraine 1918

World War II
Central Pacific
New Guinea (with arrowhead)
Leyte (with arrowhead)
Luzon (with arrowhead)
Southern Philippines (with arrowhead)

Korean War
UN Defensive
UN Offensive
CCF Intervention
First UN Counteroffensive
CCF Spring Offensive
UN Summer–Fall Offensive
Second Korean Winter
Korea, Summer 1953

Vietnam
Defense
Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase II
Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet 69/Counteroffensive
Summer–Fall 1969
Winter–Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase VII

Southwest Asia
Defense of Saudi Arabia
Liberation and Defense of
Kuwait


Decorations


Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered DEFENSE OF
KOREA (24th Infantry Division cited; DA GO 45, 1950)


Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM
1965–1966 (2d Howitzer Battalion, 13th Artillery, cited; DA GO 17, 1968)


Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM
1966–1968 (7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, cited; DA GO 70, 1969)


Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM
1967–1968 (3d Battalion, 13th Artillery, cited; DA GO 1, 1969, as amended by
DA GO 17, 1969)


Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM
1968–1969 (2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, cited; DA GO 36, 1970)


Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER
1944 TO 4 JULY 1945 (13th Field Artillery Battalion cited; DA GO 47, 1950)

 

 

 

Annotation
July 5, 1950

Korean_War


Scotty: "In the afternoon, the sky clouded over and a light mist settled over our position. About 1300, we attempted to reestablish communications with the infantry, and a patrol was formed to contact them. As the patrol prepared to leave the battery area, we observed our infantrymen fleeing south to our right front. They had expended all their ammunition and were withdrawing-some without shoes, some without weapons, but all with the same thought: `Get out.'


"I talked to Colonel Perry, who had been wounded when the command post was hit, and we decided to withdraw. We went down to get some vehicles for transportation. We were fortunate we had camouflaged them so well that few of them had been touched. It was impossible to get the howitzers out of the position, so we took the breech blocks and infiltrated to the base of the hill where we regrouped.


"We mounted the vehicles, one jeep and two (I think) two and one-half ton trucks, and drove south. Colonel Perry and I were riding in the jeep. We wanted to turn to the right but a burning vehicle blocked the road. Around the next curve, we ran right into an enemy tank that had turned around and was apparently returning to attack us from the rear. Some of the enemy soldiers had dismounted and were eating. They appeared as surprised as we were.


"We turned the jeep and convoying vehicles around and headed back north and then took a road to the east. (We had a Korean liaison officer in the jeep with us, and he knew the country.)


"We stopped to pick up as many of our infantrymen as we could find and then continued down the road. A heavy overcast and light mist settled like a blanket over the battlefield as we departed.

Korean_War


"We reached a reserve unit-it might have been the rear element of the 21st, or it could have been the 13th FAB. The mess sergeant and supply sergeant with their sections had received enemy fire and the gasoline reserve had been hit.


These men withdrew through the hills and rejoined us at the rear.

[note]


"We mounted the vehicles, one jeep and two (I think) two and one-half ton trucks, and drove south. Colonel Perry and I were riding in the jeep. We wanted to turn to the right but a burning vehicle blocked the road. Around the next curve, we ran right into an enemy tank that had turned around and was apparently returning to attack us from the rear. Some of the enemy soldiers had dismounted and were eating. They appeared as surprised as we were.
"We turned the jeep and convoying vehicles around and headed back north and then took a road to the east. (We had a Korean liaison officer in the jeep with us, and he knew the country.)


"We stopped to pick up as many of our infantrymen as we could find and then continued down the road. A heavy overcast and light mist settled like a blanket over the battlefield as we departed.


"We reached a reserve unit-it might have been the rear element of the 21st, or it could have been the 13th FAB. The mess sergeant and supply sergeant with their sections had received enemy fire and the gasoline reserve had been hit.


These men withdrew through the hills and rejoined us at the rear. We rested there for two days and were re-equipped with South Korean equipment and returned to the line."

Korean_War


L to R Front:
Lieutenants Scott (A/52 Battery Commander),
Yoon (Korean Liaison Officer),
Thompson (A/52 Executive Officer),
Haney (just attached to the battery) and
Harg (behind Scott, also just attached).


Thompson, Haney and Harg went forward with the infantry for the battle.


Thompson was killed and Haney was presumed to have been killed. Harg was from Service Battery; Scotty doesn't know his fate.


Scotty received the Silver Star Medal for his courage and calm leadership. There were approximately 31 men from the artillery battalion killed, wounded or missing from the battle, most of whom were up front with the infantry.[7]

[note]

July 13, 1950

Korean_War Korean_War


From Tokyo [5-leaving about noon] Collins and Vandenberg flew to Korea in a C47 with Johnnie Walker - a six hour trip.

By that time Walker had established Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu, a large city with good communications facilities and an airstrip, fifty-five air miles northwest of Pusan and sixty-five miles southeast of Taejŏn. A "tired and greatly worried" Bill Dean jeeped rearward from Taejŏn to Taegu in order to meet with Collins and Walker.

Owing to the need to fly out of Taegu before dark, [5-2001] Collins. and Vandenberg stayed only one hour.[5-16]


The military overview in South Korea as presented to Collins and Vandenberg that evening, July 13, by Eighth Army briefer's was not altogether reassuring.[5-17]

Korean_War


• On the "western front" at the day old Kum River line, the NKPA 3rd and 4th Infantry divisions (and possibly another, the 2nd) were preparing to renew the assault and had already commenced a withering artillery barrage.

Korean_War

Dean's newly arrived 19th Regiment had relieved the shattered 21st on the river, backed up closely by Miller Perry's 52nd FAB and more deeply by Allen's 11th and the 13th FABs.

Korean_WarKorean_War

On the left of the 19th was the reorganizing 34th Regiment, backed up closely by Dawson's 63rd FAB. Dean still had no faith in the 34th.

Korean_War

The 1st Cav Division, redirected from Inch'ŏn to southern Korea, would land on July 18 and immediately move up to reinforce the 24th Division in Taejŏn. Walker believed with its help he might stabilize the western front. But he desperately needed extra infantry battalions to bring the regiments up to strength, fillers and replacements, the bigger 3.5 inch bazookas and other antitank weapons, and, not least, greatly improved close air support from FEAF.

Korean_War


• On the "central front," directly north of Taegu, the NKPA was driving south from Wŏnju along two parallel corridors, aiming for Taejŏn.

Korean_War

To avoid that catastrophe - and to put backbone in the ROK Army - Walker was directing the newly arriving 25th Division to reinforce that sector.

[note]

July 15, 1950

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

Late that afternoon Bill Dean, having been apprised of the 34th's collapse, sent an encouraging message to Wadlington and Meloy:

"Hold everything we have until we find out where we stand - might not be too bad - may be able to hold - make reconnaissance - may be able to knock those people out and reconsolidate."

But these words were scarcely on the way when an entirely new threat to Taejŏn appeared to be developing. Intelligence reported that the ROKs on the "central front" were giving way in panic, possibly opening the way for the NKPA to attack Taejŏn from the northeast.

Korean_War

To meet this new threat, Dean ordered Stephens's regrouped 21st Regiment (1,100 men) to deploy to Okch'ŏn, due east of Taejŏn, to prevent an encirclement which might cut off the 19th and 34th.[5-30]

Korean_War


The collapse of Wadlington's 34th Regiment left only Stan Meloy's Chicks holding the Kum River line. Initially Meloy had deployed the Chicks thus:

the 1/19, commanded by Otho T. Winstead, thirty-five, at the river;

the 2/19, commanded by Thomas M. McGrail, forty-one, in reserve, except for its E Company, which held the extreme east flank on the river.

Korean_War Korean_War Korean_War

The Chicks were supported by the 13th FAB, commanded by Charles W. Stratton, two batteries of Perry's 52nd FAB and Ben Allen's 11th FAB. When the 34th melted away Meloy was compelled to commit McGrail's reserve 2/19 to fill the void on his left, holding merely one rifle company (F) to serve as regimental reserve.[5-31]

[note]

July 16, 1950

Korean_War


Winstead inherited a confused and disintegrating flock of Chicks. At that point his former outfit, the 1/19, now commanded by Robert M. Miller, was flying apart and trying to withdraw but was thwarted by the roadblock at the rear. Perry's 52nd FAB was under heavy attack; the more rearward 11th and 13th FABs were loading up and pulling out.

In the left (or west) sector Tom McGrail and his 2/19 forces were falling back under vicious fire, bypassing the roadblock to the west, as instructed by Meloy. Leaving Logan to try to break the roadblock, Winstead went forward to steady the 1/19 and probably to find some way of evacuating the wounded Meloy around the roadblock. Shortly thereafter Winstead was killed by enemy fire.[5-34]

Korean_War


Apprised of this latest disaster, Bill Dean came forward from Taejŏn, leading a mini-rescue force: two light tanks and four antiaircraft (A/A) vehicles.* South of the roadblock Dean met the regimental S3, Ed Logan, and the 2/19 commander, Thomas M. McGrail, both of whom had skirted around it with various forces.

Logan volunteered to lead the rescue team against the road block, but Dean chose McGrail for that mission, ordering Logan to the rear to find and prepare a new defensive line in front of Taejŏn.

Korean_War

*Two of these vehicles were M16 halftracks mounting four interlinked .50caliber machine guns (Quad 50s).

Korean_War

The other two were M19, fully tracked vehicles, mounting two interlinked 40mm Bofors automatic cannons (Twin 40s).

Korean_War

M-24 Chaffee (Light) Tank

Developed - or over-developed - in World War II as A/A weapons to fend off prop planes, they were obsolete A/A weapons in the jet plane age. However, in Korea, these weapons, each with terrific firepower, proved to be highly useful in supporting the infantry. Hence A/A battalions were to be much in demand.[5-35]


While this discussion was going on, the exec, Chan Chandler, came barreling south on the road in a jeep, leading four other jeeps loaded with wounded, all of which had run the roadblock. In this perilous journey all the wounded men had been hit again one or more times; Chandler himself had been struck in the leg. Chandler continued going south and was eventually evacuated, along with other wounded Chicks, to a hospital in Japan, where he was to remain for forty-five days before rejoining the regiment.[5-36]

[note]

July 19, 1950

Korean_War

By the time Beauchamp,_Charles_E._Col_USA.htm"> Beauchamp took command of the 34th, Dean had conceived a crude plan for holding Taejŏn two more days.

The 34th Regiment, supported by batteries of the 11th, 13th, and 63rd FABs (in all 4,000 men), would meet and block the NKPA in the northwest sectors near the airstrip, where the 34th CP was located. Lighter forces were deployed southwest and south; one company (L) would block the road from Nonsan. The division Reconnaissance Company, temporarily attached to the 34th, would block due south on the road to Kumsan.

Korean_War

Since Dean was still greatly concerned about the reported NKPA drive from the northeast (through the retreating ROKS, on the "central front"), he left Stephens's battered 21st in the Okch'ŏn area, considerably east of the city along the Taejŏn–Taegu road, to hold an exit through which the 34th could withdraw. The shattered 19th remained in the Yŏngdong area as division reserve.[5-46]

Korean_War

The NKPA plan for capturing the city was designed to take advantage of the weaknesses in this defensive deployment. The 3rd Division would attack frontally, as Dean expected, down the main Sŏul–Pusan highway from the northwest. But there would be no attack from the northeast at Okch'ŏn. Moreover, unknown to Dean and not expected, the 4th Division was to mount a sophisticated encircling attack from the southwest through Nonsan and Kumsan, where the American defenses were weakest. Beauchamp unwittingly played into his enemy's hands when he (unknown to Dean) ordered the division Reconnaissance Company, which was blocking south on the Kumsan road, to pull into the city to reinforce the 34th directly. This, as Dean wrote later, not only made the division "blind as to what the enemy was doing on the south flank" but also considerably thinned out its southern defense.[5-47]

The NKPA attack on Taejŏn began on the morning of July 19. As expected, the 3rd Division hit hard with artillery and tanks from the northwest at Yusŏng, where Red Ayres's 1/34 was dug in on the main highway. Two of Ayres's outposted platoons were flanked and cut off, but the rest of the battalion held on for the better part of the day, supported by the guns of the 11th and 13th FABs, emplaced at the rear, and by sporadic (and largely ineffective) FEAF air strikes.

[note]

July 29, 1950

Korean_War Korean_War


In the 24th Division's northern sector, near Kŏch'ang, Charles Beauchamp's 34th Regiment was hanging on - but barely. On July 29 the NKPA 4th Division fell on the 34th in a fury. Red Ayres's 1/34 and Jack Smith's 3/34 withdrew under the pressure, falling back toward Sanje. Simultaneously the elements of Charles Stratton's 13th FAB, supporting the 34th, panicked and bugged out.

Korean_War Korean_War

Church reinforced Beauchamp with the ROK 17th Regiment, which was still being advised by KMAG veteran Joe Darrigo, and with Dick Stephens's 21st Regiment (from P'ohang-Yŏngdök), which consisted then mainly of Brad Smith's 1/21. But Stephens, Beauchamp, Smith, and Darrigo were not able to contain the attack.

[note]

 

 

 

Sunday July 5, 1950 (Day 011)

Sunday June 25, 1950 (Day 001)

Thursday July 13, 1950 (Day 019)

Saturday July 15, 1950 (Day 021)

Sunday July 16, 1950 (Day 022)

Wednesday July 19, 1950 (Day 025)

Saturday July 29, 1950 (Day 035)

August 6, 1950

August

When it became clear that what Perez reported was true, Charles Beauchamp ordered Ayres to counterattack with his 1/34. Perhaps too hastily, Ayres sent his C Company, commanded by newcomer Clyde M. Akridge, hurrying forward by truck, while the other two came behind on foot. Rushed fragmented into battle, the battalion suffered a severe setback. Akridge's C Company was decimated; A and B companies were stopped in their tracks. Wounded three times, Akridge had to be evacuated. While bravely attempting to rescue the men of C Company, Ayres himself was trapped and cut off for hours. "He came out crawling on his belly," Perez remembered. Meanwhile, during the confused action that day Perez's 3/34 fled in all directions, as did Battery B of the 13th FAB, whose men left behind four or five howitzers and numerous vehicles.

August

John Church apparently was not fully apprised of the weight of the NKPA attack. Perhaps believing it was merely a strong probe, he ordered Ned Moore's reserve 19th Infantry to counterattack, clean out the NKPA, and restore the divisions positions at the river by dark. In response, Moore sent Tom McGrail's 2/19 forward by truck and alerted Robert Rhea to prepare to follow with his 1/19. Both of the 19ths battalions, bedeviled by a shortage of trucks, conflicting information, and other factors, were slow to move up.

[note]

Sunday June 25, 1950 (Day 001)

Wednesday July 05, 1950 (Day 11)

Sunday June 25, 1950 (Day 001)

Sunday August 6, 1950 (Day 43)