Unit Details

SEVENTH Fleet

(Task Force 70)

 

Task Force 70 (SEVENTH Fleet)

 

USN_Units


The Seventh Fleet was based at Naval Operating Base, Subic Bay, Luzon, in the Philippines, the main operational command for naval forces in the western Pacific. It departed the Philippines on 26 June 1950 and was assigned to NAVFE on 28 June. It remained the major naval operational command in Korean waters throughout the war.


Commanders:


Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble 6 May 1950 (Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins, acting commander at the beginning of the war)

Vice Admiral H. M. Martin 28 Mar. 1951
Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe 3 Mar. 1952 (dual command of NAVFE)
Vice Admiral J. J. Clark 20 May 1952

•Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble (20 May 1950 - 28 March 1951)
•Vice Adm. Harold. M. Martin (28 March 1951 - 3 March 1952)
•Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe (3 March - 20 May 1952)
•Vice Adm. Joseph. J. Clark (20 May 1952 - 1 December 1953)
•Vice Adm. Alfred M. Pride (1 December 1953 - 9 December 1955)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

United States Seventh Fleet
United States Seventh Fleet


USN_Units
Seventh Fleet
Active 1943–Present
Country United States
Branch United States Navy
Type Fleet
Part of United States Pacific Fleet
Garrison/HQ United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka
Nickname 'Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club' (Vietnam War)
Commanders
Current
commander
Vice Admiral Scott H. Swift
Notable
commanders
Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid



USN_Units

Scott R. Van Buskirk

The Seventh Fleet is the United States Navy's permanent forward projection force operating forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan, with units positioned near Japan and South Korea. It is a component force of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 60 ships, 350 aircraft and 60,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel. With the support of its Task Force Commanders, it has three major assignments:

 

Structure



USN_Units

 

The Seventh Fleet's area of responsibility, 2009.

The fleet once had its headquarters in Gaeta, Italy, commanded by a Vice Admiral. However, beginning in 2004, the Sixth Fleet staff was combined with United States Naval Forces Europe staff, up to that time headquartered in London. Since then the staff has operated as a single entity with a four star admiral who serves as Commander, Naval Forces Europe and Commander, Naval Forces Africa. This admiral has a three star Deputy Commander who also carries the title Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet. The staff as a whole is known as Commander, Naval Forces

 

History

The Seventh Fleet was formed on 15 March 1943 in Brisbane, Australia, during World War II, under the command of Admiral Arthur S. "Chips" Carpender. It served in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) under General Douglas MacArthur, and the Seventh Fleet commander also served as commander of Allied naval forces in the SWPA.

Most of the ships of the Royal Australian Navy were also part of the fleet from 1943 to 1945 as part of Task Force 74 (formerly the Anzac Squadron). The Seventh Fleet—under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid—formed a large part of the Allied forces at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. After the end of the war, the 7th Fleet moved its headquarters to Qingdao,, China.



USN_Units

Princeton of the United States Third Fleet on fire east of Luzon at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

After the war, on 1 January 1947, the Fleet's name was changed to Naval Forces Western Pacific. On 19 August 1949, just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the force was designated as United States Seventh Task Fleet. On 11 February 1950, the force assumed the name United States Seventh Fleet, which it holds today.

In late 1948, the 7th Fleet moved its principal base of operations to the Philippines, where the Navy, following the war, had developed new facilities at Subic Bay and an airfield at Sangley Point. Peacetime operations of the Seventh Fleet were under the control of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur E. Radford, but standing orders provided that, when operating in Japanese waters or in the event of an emergency, control would pass to Commander Naval Forces Far East, a component of General Douglas MacArthur/a>'s occupation force.

 Korean War

Seventh Fleet units participated in all major operation of the Korean War and Vietnam war. The first Navy jet aircraft used in combat was launched from a Task Force 77 (TF 77) aircraft carrier on 3 July 1950. The landings at Inch'ŏn, Korea/a> were conducted by Seventh Fleet amphibious ships. The battleships Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri and Wisconsin all served as flagships for Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet during the Korean War. During the Korean War, the Seventh Fleet consisted of Task Force 70, a maritime patrol force provided by Fleet Air Wing One and Fleet Air Wing Six, Task Force 72, the Formosa Patrol, Task Force 77, and Task Force 79, a service support squadron.

 Operations

Of the 50-60 ships typically assigned to Seventh Fleet, 18 operate from U.S. facilities in Japan and Guam. These forward-deployed units represent the heart of Seventh Fleet, and the centerpieces of American forward presence in Asia. They are 17 steaming days closer to locations in Asia than their counterparts based in the continental United States. It would take three to five times the number of rotationally-based ships in the U.S. to equal the same presence and crisis response capability as these 18 forward deployed ships. On any given day, about 50% of Seventh Fleet forces are deployed at sea throughout the area of responsibility.

Following the end of the Cold War, the two major military scenarios in which the Seventh Fleet would be used would be in case of conflict in Korea or a conflict between People's Republic of China and Taiwan (Republic of China) in the Taiwan Strait.

It was reported on 10 May 2012 that USS Freedom (LCS-1) would be despatched to Singapore in the northern spring of 2013 for a roughly 10-month deployment. On 2 June 2012 the U.S. and Singaporean Defense Ministers announced that Singapore has agreed 'in principle' to the US request 'to forward deploy up to four littoral combat ships to Singapore on a rotational basis.' Officials stressed however that vessels will not be permanently based there and their crews will live aboard during ship visits.

 Fleet Commanders

.
•Vice Adm. Arthur S. Carpender (15 March-26 November 1943)
•Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid (26 November 1943 - 20 November 1945)
•Vice Adm. Daniel E. Barbey (20 November 1945 - 2 October 1946)
•Vice Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr. (2 October 1946 - 28 February 1948)
•Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger II (28 February 1948 - 28 August 1949)
•Vice Adm. Russell S. Berkey (28 August 1949 - 5 April 1950)
•Rear Adm. Walter. F. Boone (5 April - 20 May 1950)
•Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble (20 May 1950 - 28 March 1951)
•Vice Adm. Harold. M. Martin (28 March 1951 - 3 March 1952)
•Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe (3 March - 20 May 1952)
•Vice Adm. Joseph. J. Clark (20 May 1952 - 1 December 1953)
•Vice Adm. Alfred M. Pride (1 December 1953 - 9 December 1955)
•Vice Adm. Stuart H. Ingersoll (19 December 1955 - 28 January 1957)
•Vice Adm. Wallace M. Beakley (28 January 1957 - 30 September 1958)
•Vice Adm. Frederick N. Kivette (30 September 1958 - 7 March 1960)
•Vice Adm. Charles D. Griffin (7 March 1960 - 28 October 1961)
•Vice Adm. William A. Schoech (28 October 1961 - 13 October 1962)
•Vice Adm. Thomas H. Moorer (13 October 1962 - 15 June 1964)
•Vice Adm. Roy L. Johnson (15 June 1964 - 1 March 1965)
•Vice Adm. Paul P. Blackburn (1 March - 9 October 1965)
•Rear Adm. Joseph W. Williams, Jr. (9 October - 13 December 1965)
•Vice Adm. John J. Hyland (13 December 1965 - 6 November 1967)
•Vice Adm. William F. Bringle (6 November 1967 - 10 March 1970)
•Vice Adm. Maurice F. Weisner (10 March 1970 - 18 June 1971)
•Vice Adm. William P. Mack (18 June 1971 - 23 May 1972)
•Vice Adm. James L. Holloway III (23 May 1972 - 28 July 1973)
•Vice Adm. George P. Steele (28 July 1973 - 14 June 1975)
•Vice Adm. Thomas B. Hayward (14 June 1975 - 24 July 1976)
•Vice Adm. Robert B. Baldwin (24 July 1976 - 31 May 1978)
•Vice Adm. Sylvester Robert Foley, Jr. (31 May 1978 - 14 February 1980)
••Vice Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost (14 February 1980 - 15 September 1981)
•Vice Adm. M. Staser Holcomb (15 September 1981 - 9 May 1983)
•Vice Adm. James R. Hogg (9 May 1983 - 4 March 1985)
•Vice Adm. Paul F. McCarthy, Jr. (4 March 1985 - 9 December 1986)
•Vice Adm. Paul D. Miller (9 December 1986 - 21 October 1988)
•Vice Adm. Henry H. Mauz, Jr. (21 October 1988 - 1 December 1990)
•Vice Adm. Stanley R. Arthur (1 December 1990 - 3 July 1992)
•Vice Adm. Timothy W. Wright (3 July 1992 - 28 July 1994)
•Vice Adm. Archie R. Clemins (28 July 1994 - 13 September 1996)
•Vice Adm. Robert J. Natter (13 September 1996 - 12 August 1998)
•Vice Adm. Walter F. Doran (12 August 1998 - 12 July 2000)
•Vice Adm. James W. Metzger (12 July 2000 - 18 July 2002)
•Vice Adm. Robert F. Willard (18 July 2002 - 6 August 2004)
•Vice Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert (6 August 2004 - 12 September 2006)
•Vice Adm. William Douglas Crowder (12 September 2006 - 12 July 2008)
•Vice Adm. John M. Bird (12 July 2008 - 10 September 2010)
•Vice Adm. Scott R. Van Buskirk (10 September 2010 - 7 September 2011)/td>
•Vice Adm. Scott Swift (7 September 2011 - Present))

 Notes

This is the United States Seventh Fleet Korean War order of battle.

 


 June 26, 1950 0915

Bio

1915 Washington Time

Secretary of State Acheson was waiting for me at the airport as was Secretary of Defense Johnson. We hurried to Blair House where we were joined by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace. & Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews; Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter General of the Army Omar N. Bradley; the Army Chief General Collins; the Air Force Chief General Vandenberg; and Admiral Forrest Sherman Chief of Naval Operations.

Dean Acheson was accompanied by Undersecretaries Webb and Rusk and Assistant Secretary John Hickerson and Ambassador- at-Large Philip Jessup. It was late and we went at once to the dining room for dinner. I asked that no discussion take place until dinner was ended and over and the Blair House staff had withdrawn.

Earlier that Sunday evening. Acheson reported, the Security Council of the United Nations had, by a vote of nine to nothing, approved a resolution declaring that a breach of the peace had been committed by the North Korean action and ordering the North Koreans to cease action and withdraw their forces.

I then called on Acheson to present the recommendations which the State and Defense Departments had prepared. He presented the following recommendations for immediate action:

 1) That MacArthur should evacuate the Americans from Korea --including the dependents of the military mission — and, in order to do so, should keep open the Kimp'o and other airports, repelling all hostile attacks thereon. In doing this, his air forces should stay south of the 38th Parallel.

2) MacArthur should be instructed to get ammunition and supplies to the Korean army by airdrop and otherwise.

3) That the Seventh Fleet should be ordered into the Formosa Strait to prevent the conflict from spreading to that area.  We should make a statement that the fleet would repel any attack on Formosa and that no attacks should be made from Formosa on the mainland.

At this point I interrupted to say that the Seventh Fleet should be ordered north at once, but that I wanted to withhold making any statement until the fleet was in position. After this report I asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views he might have in addition.

Two things stand out in this discussion.

One was the complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away from it.

The other point which stands out was the difference in view of what might be called for Vandenberg and Sherman thought that air and naval aid might be enough. Collins said that if the Korean army was really broken, ground forces would be necessary.

I expressed the opinion that the Russians were trying to get Korea by default gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war and would offer no resistance. I thought that we were still holding the stronger hand, although how much stronger it was hard to tell.

 

At 1915 hours that [Saturday] night [1915+1400=3315-2400=0915] the President landed at Washington and drove directly to his temporary residence at Blair House. Here were assembled the key officers of the Departments of State and Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Omar Bradley (chairman), General J. Lawton Collins (Army), Admiral Forrest P Sherman (Navy), and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (Air Force). Most of the talk over the dinner table reflected a hope that the South Koreans could hold with the help of American arms and equipment which General MacArthur was sending them. The main theme of conversation, however, was that the Communists appeared to be repeating patterns of aggression similar to those acts which had set off World War II.
 
After dinner President Truman opened the conference with the statement that he did not wish to make decisions that night, except such as were immediately necessary. Secretary Acheson then presented three recommendations which had been prepared by the State and Defense Departments:


1) that MacArthur would send arms and ammunition to Korea,


2) that MacArthur would furnish ships and planes to assist and protect the evacuation of American dependents from Korea, and


3) that the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be ordered northward from the Philippines to report to MacArthur.


 Truman asked for comments, and the discussion worked around to what the United States might have to do to save South Korea. Vandenberg and Sherman thought that air and naval aid might be enough. Collins stated that if the ROK Army was really broken, American ground forces would be needed. At the end of the meeting President Truman directed that orders be issued implementing the three recommendations made by the State and Defense Departments.#74    

June 26, 1950 1200

Bio

Throughout the morning the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, and the military chiefs were in conference at the Pentagon. [note]

[About noon in Korea] This opening thrust was quickly deflected, and the discussion properly turned to the larger picture: Stalin and the Kremlin. What did Stalin's decision to resort to "raw aggression" portend? Bradley speculated. He did not think Stalin was "ready" for global war; the Kremlin was probably "testing" America's spiritual resolve to its containment rhetoric. However, Bradley went on, this major escalation in the cold war was a "moral outrage" which the United States and United Nations could not countenance. To knuckle under in this test, he said, would be tantamount to "appeasement." One act of appeasement could lead to further acts and hence almost inevitably to global war. "We must draw the line somewhere," Bradley concluded, and Korea "offered as good an occasion for drawing the line as anywhere else.[3-19]

All fourteen men present, including most emphatically President Truman and Dean Acheson, were of like mind. All the prior policies set forth in various position papers, reached after years of careful study - that South Korea was of little strategic importance and should not be a casus belli - were summarily dismissed. On June 24, 1950, South Korea had suddenly become an area of vital importance, not strategically or militarily (as Acheson would write in his memoirs) but psychologically and symbolically. Stalin had chosen that place to escalate cold war to hot war. The line would be drawn. South Korea would be supported, not because its conquest would directly threaten America's vital interests but because a failure to meet Stalin's challenge there would be so morally derelict it might fatally damage America's prestige and lead to a collapse of the free world's will to resist Communist aggression in places that really counted.

The conferees next wrestled with these questions: How much help? What form should it take? There was a stingy approach to the problem: Minimize, not maximize, the commitment. Finally, they agreed on the following steps, to be carried out with utmost haste under the "guise of aid" to the UN, which that day had condemned the NKPA invasion and invited "all members" to help the ROKs.

 

MacArthur would proceed (as he was already doing) with sending "ammunition and equipment" to the ROKs in order to help "prevent the loss" of Sŏul.

MacArthur would rush a "survey party" to South Korea to find out what other military aid the ROKs might need to hold Sŏul.

MacArthur would provide "such naval and air action" as was necessary to prevent the loss of Sŏul partly under the guise of ensuring "safe evacuation of United States dependents and noncombatants."

The Navy's Seventh Fleet, then at Subic Bay in the Philippines, would proceed to Sasebo, Japan, to augment MacArthur's thin naval forces.[3-20]