|TASK FORCE 90. Amphibious Force, Far East.||Rear Admiral James. Henry Doyle, USN|
|Mount McKinnley (AGC-7), Flagship||1 Amphibious Command Ship|
|Cavalier (APA-37)||1 Amphibious transport|
|Union (AKA-106)||1 Amphibious Cargo Ship|
|LST 611||1 Landing Ship Tank|
|Arikara (ATF-98)||1 Fleet Tug|
|TASK FORCE 96. Naval Force, Japan.||Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, USN|
|Task Group 96.5. Support Group.||Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, USN|
|Task Unit 96.5.1. Flagship Element.||Captain Jesse C. Sowell, USN|
|Juneau (CL-119), Flagship||1 Light Cruiser|
|Task Unit 96.5.2. Destroyer Element.||Captain Halle C. Allan, Jr., USN|
Destroyer Division 91:
Mansfield (DD-728) (Flagship),
De Haven (DD-727),
Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729)
|Task Unit 96.5.3. British Commonwealth Support Element.||Comdr. I. H. McDonald, RAN.|
|HMAS Shoalhaven||1 PF.|
|Task Unit 96.5.6. Submarine Element.||Lt. Comdr. Lloyd. V. Young, USN|
|Remora (SS-487)||1 Submarine|
|Task Group 96.6. Minesweeping Group.||Lt. Comdr. Darcy. V. Shouldice, USN|
|Mine Squadron 3:|
Mine Division 31:
|6 Coastal Marine Sweepers.|
Mine Division 32:
Pledge (AM-277) (Flagship),
1 On loan from Seventh Fleet.
2 In reduced commission.
3 In reserve.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Task Force 90 was a United States Navy command during the Korean War that controlled the amphibious forces in theatre. It reported directly to Commander Naval Forces Far East. Its most high profile operation was the Incheon amphibious assault, Operation Chromite.
It was later active during Operation Passage to Freedom after the Geneva Accords of 1955.
Commanded by Rear Admiral James Henry Doyle, USN had 5 vessels (Task Units) under his command,
Mount KinIey (AGC-7), Flagship - Amphibious Command Ship
Cavalier (APA-37) - Amphibious Transport
Union (AKA-106) - Amphibious Cargo Ship
USS Crook County (LST-611), - Landing Ship Tank
Arikara (ATF-98) - 1 Fleet Tug
June 25, 1950
The invasion of South Korea found Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Group busy with its training duties. On the morning of the 25th Task Force 90 got underway from Yokosuka, with elements of the 35th Regimental Combat Team embarked, to conduct landing exercises outside Tokyo Bay. Although operations were carried out on the 26th and 28th, in accordance with the training order, the attention of both teachers and pupils was progressively distracted by reports of happenings in Korea. During the second landing observers from the Far East Air Forces were ordered back to their stations; on completion of the exercise the ships returned at once to Yokosuka to debark the troops.
June 25 1950
The westward movement of so large an increment of naval strength posed urgent problems of logistic support. The naval population of the Western Pacific, which on 25 June approached 11,000, was to more than triple in the space of five weeks. To plan and organize in one month's time for the support of such a force 6,000 miles from home is no mean problem, the more so when, in addition to food and clothing, these individuals are busily consuming fuel, ammunition, equipment, and spare parts at an accelerated rate.
Overseas stocks of the countless items needed to support a modern fighting force were limited. At Pearl Harbor a supply officer could find everything, or almost everything, but to the westward the situation was spotty. At Yokosuka, by good fortune, there were fairly sizable supplies of general materials and nucleus stocks of technical spares. But Guam, which had supported very large naval forces during the war against Japan, had nothing: the island's mission of fleet support had been cancelled in 1947 . At Subic Bay in the Philippines there were small quantities of various items, but Subic, originally planned as a major fleet base, had been reduced to partial maintenance status in January. All this had been done in the name of economy; it had been rationalized by the stated intention of providing mobile support for any forces west of Pearl Harbor; such support was now called for with a vengeance.
The concept of mobile support for the fighting ships of the U.S. Navy has a long history. In its origins it dates back to the War with Tripoli when the frigate USS John Adams, with reduced armament, was assigned to shuttle service between the Chesapeake and the Mediterranean carrying drafts of men and shipments of supplies for Commodore Preble’s squadron. But provision of the spare spars and cordage, the peas and salt meat, which the Adams brought out, was simplicity itself compared to the problem of supporting a modern navy. Long before the electronic age the progress of technology had threatened to restrict the radius of fleet action, in the first instance in the fundamental question of fuel.
The fuel problem and the other logistic complications which came with mechanization first faced the United States in connection with the Civil War blockade of Gulf coast ports. They arose again following the War with Spain, as the immense distances of the Pacific came to be realized, and were emphasized over the years by increasing possibilities of trouble with Japan. As early as 1904 Civil Engineer Andrew C. Cunningham had put forward the idea of a floating base; efforts at mobile support of naval forces in Europe had been made during the First World War; and by the middle twenties the concept of the mobile base had become the accepted one for support of the fleet at sea. Following Pearl Harbor performance caught up with precept, and in the later stages of the Pacific War great fleets of tenders, repair ships, and floating dry-docks moved westward from atoll to atoll in attendance on the striking forces.
The concept of mobile support had abundantly proved itself as both economically sound and strategically effective. But its wartime embodiment, the vast collection of men and material which made up Service Squadron 10, was no more. The total roster of Service Force ships assigned to the Western Pacific on 25 June consisted of
one destroyer tender,
a fleet oiler on shuttle duty for the Seventh Fleet,
a fleet tug, and
an LST on loan to Task Force 90 for training purposes.
There had been no prior planning for a minor war, or indeed for anything short of full mobilization. In the sphere of fleet logistics, as elsewhere, the response to the North Korean invasion was to be an exercise in extemporization.
Responsibility for the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet and of other Pacific naval activities lay with the Service Force Pacific Fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Francis C. Denebrink, whose headquarters were at Pearl Harbor. Like everyone else the Service Force had felt the impact of the fiscal year just ending. Not only in the Western Pacific had mobile support been reduced to a bare minimum: the only hospital ship and the only fleet stores issue ship in the Pacific Fleet had been decommissioned, and the lone dock landing ship in Admiral Denebrink’s command had escaped this fate only as a result of the requirements of Operation Greenhouse, the atomic test series then pending at Eniwetok.
June 26, 1950 0900
The invasion of South Korea found Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Group busy with its training duties. On the morning of the 25th Task Force 90 got underway from Yokosuka, with elements of the 35th Regimental Combat Team embarked, to conduct landing exercises outside Tokyo Bay. Although operations were carried out on the26th and 28th, in accordance with the training order, the attention of both teachers and pupils was progressively distracted by reports of happenings in Korea. During the second landing observers from the Far East Air Forces were ordered back to their stations; on completion of the exercise the ships returned at once to Yokosuka to debark the troops.
July 14, 1950